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Abstract The current research is based on the assumption that the result
of tax inspections is not only collection of taxes and nes. The information
about audited taxpayers is also collected and helps to renew a priori knowl-
edge of each agent's evasion propensity and obtain new a posteriori estimate
of this propensity. In the beginning of the following tax period the scal au-
thority can correct auditing strategy using updated information on every
taxpayer. Each inspection is considered as a repeated game, in which the
choice of agents to audit is associated with their revealed tendency to evade.
Taxpayers also renew the information on the number of inspected neighbors
using their social connections, represented by networks of various congura-
tions, and estimate the probability of auditing before the next tax period.
Thus, the application of the Bayesian approach to the process of collecting
and disseminating information in the network of taxpayers allows to opti-
mize the audit scheme, reducing unnecessary expenses of tax authority and
eventually increasing net tax revenue. To illustrate the application of the
approach described above to the indicated problem, numerical simulation
and scenario analysis were carried out.
Keywords: tax control, tax evasions, risk propensity, structured network,
a posteriori information, Bayesian approach.
1. Introduction
Taxation is one of the most important areas of the state economy, regula-
tion and social policy. In accordance with the basic denitions of the tax system
(Samuelson and Nordhaus, 2007), it has the following basic functions: scal, social,
regulatory and control. It is worth to remember that tax control is one of the most
important tools for the administration of the tax system. Therefore, it is clear that
many works, such as (Antunes et al., 2006; Antocia et al., 2014; Bloomquist, 2006;
Chander and Wilde, 1998; Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo, 2002; Sanchez and
Sobel, 1993; Vasin and Morozov, 2005), are devoted to the research in this area
of the economy.
The mentioned models of tax control apply dierent approaches to mathematical
modelling of the studied problem. A lot of them can be represented by the mathe-
matical decision theory and its separate branches  contract theory and mathemat-
ical game theory, and also by various directions of probabilistic modelling.
Most of the works which develop these approaches have a set of common features.
Most of them are based on the models with hierarchical structure similar to the
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principal-to-agent scheme. In general case agents are assumed to be risk-neutral.
In the mentioned studies cases the problems have the following forms of solutions
(which are the modications and extensions of similar formalizations): agent's
optimal reporting rule (Chander and Wilde, 1998), optimal contract (Sanchez
and Sobel, 1993), (Chander and Wilde, 1998), threshold rule (Vasin and Moro-
zov, 2005) etc.
One of modications of the solutions from the described class was proposed
in (Bure and Kumacheva, 2010). In this model risk-neutral taxpayers refuse their
evasion from high level of income H to low level of income L if the probability PL
of audit of the agents, who declared low level of income, is not less then the optimal
value of auditing probability P ∗. But the application of this result has a number
of disadvantages and limitations, both in practice and in theoretical assumption
underlying the model. Among them there are the following problems, common with
the previously listed studies.
The Problem 1 can be formulated as the limited budget of the tax author-
ity, which makes reaching the optimal values of auditing probabilities to be ex-
tremely rare event. Therefore, the tax authority needs to nd the way to opti-
mize tax collections. This problem was discussed previously in (Kumacheva, 2012;
Kumacheva and Gubar, 2015; Kumacheva et al., 2018; Kumacheva et al., 2019).
TheProblem 2 is in the fact that the game-theoretic formulation of the problem
(Chander and Wilde, 1998; Sanchez and Sobel, 1993; Vasin and Morozov, 2005;
Bure and Kumacheva, 2010) is most often considered as models with complete
information. That is, taxpayers are assumed to choose their strategy as the best
response on the strategy of the tax authority. But in practice, such information can
be only indirect. Accordingly, agents do not know the probability of audit and can
only estimate it.
Problem 3 is in that the tax authority knows nothing on the population struc-
ture. There is no information about each agent's risk propensity. This is an obstacle
to the choice of optimal auditing strategy, corresponding to the real distribution of
risk statuses of the population. Previously the ideas about using additional informa-
tion about taxpayers were discussed in (Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo, 2002;
Bure and Kumacheva, 2005; Kumacheva, 2012).
The listed problems lead to the logical conclusion that information is a key
factor in modelling of tax control. Previously, the issue of disseminating informa-
tion about possible tax audits was explored as a way to stimulate agents to pay
taxes honestly. Various concepts have been proposed to simulate the process of
information spreading. For example, an application of epidemic processes, based
on SIR and SIS models was investigated in (Gubar et al., 2015; Gubar et al., 2016)
and (Gubar et al., 2017b). Another attitude, which is the modelling based on evo-
lutionary processes on the network, was considered in (Gubar et al., 2017a; Gubar
et al., 2017b) and (Kumacheva et al., 2018). The ideas of opinion dynamics based
on Markov process were studied in (Gubar et al., 2019).
The current work proposes a new approach based on a combination of the pro-
cesses of disseminating information about inspections among the taxable population
and collecting information on the risk propensity of economic agents by the tax au-
thority. Such information makes it possible to re-estimate the probabilities of audit
of certain taxpayers using the Bayesian procedure (De Groot, 1974; Zellner, 1997).
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This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the brief description
of the static model which lays in the basis of our research. In section 3 we consider
the process of auditing from the standpoints of principal and agents and formulate
several assumptions useful to make the studied model and the simulation built
on it closer to reality. Section 4 describes the numerical experiments and parameter
analysis based on the mentioned assumptions. And, nally, in section 5 we formulate
the conclusions we made from our modelling and simulating, and prospects for the
future study of the proposed model.
2. Static Model of Tax Control with Two Levels of Income of Taxpayers
The model formulated further is based on the static model of tax control (Bure
and Kumacheva, 2010). But in the current study we will restrict our consideration
by two levels of income received by the taxpayers as it was done in (Chander and
Wilde, 1998; Vasin and Morozov, 2005). Without restricting generality, it can be
expanded to more number of income levels. However, the interaction pattern will
be the same as described here for the two income levels.
Following (Bure and Kumacheva, 2010), let's consider a population of n taxpay-
ers. Each of them has her/his true income ξ and can declare income η, where η ≤ ξ.
Both ξ and η can take two values  L or H, where 0 < L < H. Therefore, there are
two types of taxpayers: with high and low levels of income. The cardinality of the
corresponding sets are nH and nL: nL + nH = n.
In the further work on the model to approximate it to reality, it is possible to
consider a larger number of income gradations, as was done earlier, for example,
in (Bure and Kumacheva, 2005) or (Kumacheva, 2012). But the basic premises and
way of reasoning will remain the same. Therefore, we will adhere to the principle
previously applied in (Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo, 2002; Vasin and Moro-
zov, 2005) and (Kumacheva et al., 2019) and consider only two levels of income of
the population, formally classifying taxpayers into rich and poor.
Taxpayers who declare a high level of their income cannot be classied as evaders.
Thus, the tax authority does not need to audit such agents and, therefore, should
focus on those who declared the low level η = L. Let PL be the probability of audit
of such agents. In the case of revealed tax evasion the agent should pay (θ+π)(ξ−η),
where the constants θ and π are tax and penalty rates correspondingly. According to






As it was assumed in (Kumacheva and Gubar, 2015; Kumacheva et al., 2018;
Kumacheva et al., 2019), let's suppose that the real structure of taxable population
consists of three subgroups: risk-averse (νa), risk-neutral (νn) and risk-loving (νl),
where νa+νn+νl = 1. These subgroups can be characterized by the various agents'
behaviour proles in the similar external conditions and, therefore, by the dierent
response on the same information.
Let γL be the portion of those who declared their income as L and γH  of those
who declared H. The total population consists of these two portions: γL + γH = 1.
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3. The Auditing Process
In the current study we assume that tax authority and taxpayers interact ac-
cording to the classical hierarchical scheme principal-to-agent. Therefore the tax
auditing is sophisticated process which can be described from two dierent stand-
points: the tax authority's and the taxpayers' ones correspondingly.
3.1. Auditing from the Principal's Standpoint
The tax authority has three various goals providing tax auditing. The rst one
is obviously the tax collection (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 2007). The principal's
purpose is to collect taxes and penalties from the taxable population and, therefore,
to increase the net tax revenue:
R = n [γH θH + γL(θ L− PL c)] + nH γL PL(θ + π)(H − L), (1)
where c is the unit cost of auditing.
The second one is the population monitoring (Macho-Stadler and Perez-
Castrillo, 2002; Bure and Kumacheva, 2005; Kumacheva, 2012), which purpose is
the updating information about audited taxpayers and, thus, about their evasion
propensities. Finally, it helps to refresh the information about the distribution of
risk statuses among the population. Further we suppose that the structure of this
process can be represented by the Bayesian updating, which takes into consideration
the prior and posterior probabilities based on the principal's knowledge about each
taxpayer ex-ante and ex-post correspondingly.
The third goal is the information dissemination (Gubar et al., 2016; Gubar
et al., 2017a; Gubar et al., 2019; Kumacheva et al., 2019; Kumacheva et al., 2020).
Being strongly bounded by the state budget, the tax authority can consider the
information spreading as a tool to stimulate tax payers for honest payments. As such
information the message about high possibility of the future tax auditing among
the population can be considered, despite its real values which can be much smaller.
Bayesian Updating. Let's focus on the second purpose  population monitor-
ing. To formalize the process of information collecting based on the observation
of data on taxable population we assume the Bayesian approach (De Groot, 1974;
Zellner, 1997) as the mathematical base of this process. To study tax auditing from
this position we need to take into consideration the term Tax Story which repre-
sents an accumulated knowledge about each agent's propensity to evade. To con-
struct the k-th taxpayer's tax story we can propose the method previously investi-
gated in (Bure and Kumacheva, 2010).
Within the framework of the current study, the taxpayers are assumed to have
one of three types in accordance with their risk propensity. At the same time we
suppose that the agents' risk statuses are associated with their disposition to evade
taxation. In reality, there can be much more gradations of this tendency to evasion
than only three mentioned classes of risk propensity. Accordingly, the number of
scenarios for the auditing of taxpayers with various risk statuses is signicantly
increasing.
Let Wk be the random variable, which characterizes the k-th taxpayer's risk
propensity (or, in the discussed problem, evasion propensity). It is assumed to be
beta-distributed with parameters αk, βk. As this agent's tax story we will determine
a characteristic of the taxpayer's behaviour in the previous periods, which is a result
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of observation (inspection), presented as a Bernoulli-distributed random variableXj






After each tax period j the information about audited taxpayers is updated, thus,
posterior disposition to evade is recalculated taking into account the agent's tax
story.
Next, we can turn to the theorem from (De Groot, 1974), which is quoted ver-
batim in the appendix 6.1. That is, it can be concluded that the family of beta
distributions is conjugate to the family of Bernoulli distribution  see the appendix
6.2.
Now the procedure of Bayesian Updating for the taxpayer k can be generalized
in the following algorithm:
 Let's consider initial state (period j = 1): suppose that this taxpayer was not
audited in the previous periods, therefore, there is no information of her/his
risk propensity.
 As far as prior information is absent, let's assume that Wk is a uniform dis-
tributed (beta distributed with parameters α0k = 1 and β0k = 1).
 The tax authority audits a population with some xed probability PL.
 The tax story is formed as a result of observation (inspection), presented as a
Bernoulli-distributed random variable Xj .
 Using the tax story (2) and applying the mentioned theorem about conjugate
distributions (De Groot, 1974), tax authority can compute the new values of
parameters αjk , βjk of a posteriori distribution of Wk, which can be considered
as a priori distribution for the next tax period.
 Starting the next iteration (j = 2 . . .), related to the next tax period.
It should be noted that if there was no audit there is no renewing of the tax
story. In this case the initial distribution of Wk should be considered as a prior
distribution for the following period. In all other cases, xed values (for example,
median or some other quantile) of the posterior distribution obtained in this period
can be considered as a priori value of the probability of tax evasion in the next
period.
As the rst audit's result (for the period j = 1) two various curves can describe
the propensity to evasion: beta-distribution with parameters α1k = 1 and β1k = 2
for evaders, and with parameters α1k = 2 and β1k = 1 for non-evaders . This case is
illustrated in the gure 1: the upper curve refers to the considered risk propensity
of those taxpayers, who, according to the results of the rst audit, have revealed
evasion, the lower one  to those who was not an evader.
After the second audit (j = 2) we obtain three possible groups of agents: the
evasion propensity of twice-evaded os represented by the distribution with param-
eters α2k = 1 and β2k = 3, for those who alternate (consequence does not matter)
it has parameters α2k = 2 and β2k = 2 and for those who were found non-evaded
twice the distribution has parameters α2k = 3 and β2k = 1  see the gure 2.
After the third audit (j = 3) (see the gure 3) the number of risk statuses is in-
creasing: for those who evaded 3 times it can be represented by the distribution with
parameters α3k = 1 and β3k = 4, for those who evaded twice  with the parameters
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Fig. 1. The Results of the First Audit
Fig. 2. The Results of the Second Audit
α3k = 2 and β3k = 3, for those who did not evade twice  with parameters α3k = 3
and β3k = 2, and, nally, for non-evaders during all 3 periods  with α3k = 4 and
β3k = 1.
Fig. 3. The Results of the Third Audit
Following periods and posterior risk propensities can be modeled in a similar
way.
Pressing or Information Collecting? Thus, tax auditing allows to collect infor-
mation about the tendency of the population to evade. But in real life the budget of
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the tax authority is signicantly limited. Therefore, the principal faces a dilemma:
what is more important  to encourage honest payments (to choose the strategy of
pressing) or to gather the data on the taxpayers evasions (to choose the strategy
of information collecting)?
In the rst case, when the tax authority decides to choose pressing, the budget
should be distributed so as to audit all the evaders rst. In the case the tax authority
prefers to collect information the resource should be distributed due to audit the
largest number of agents unaudited previously.
3.2. Auditing from the Agents' Standpoint
Since in formulation of the model it was initially assumed that agents can have
one of three risk statuses, the choice of their strategies depends on which group
they belong to. If a taxpayer is risk-averse, she/he prefers to pay the taxes hon-
estly, in accordance with her/his true level of income. Risk-loving agents are tax
evaders. And only risk-neutral taxpayers will make their choice, according to their
bounded rationality  to pay or to evade. They make their decision comparing
known value P ∗ with their own estimation of actual probability PL. Therefore
they also need to collect information about possible auditing. We suppose that
agents can gather such information from their social contacts, following to the previ-
ous ideas developed in (Gubar et al., 2015; Gubar et al., 2017b; Gubar et al., 2019;
Kumacheva et al., 2018; Kumacheva et al., 2019; Kumacheva et al., 2020; Gubar et
al., 2020).
3.3. Information Dissemination: the Network Approach
Continuing the research carried out in (Nekovee et al., 2007) and (Riehl and
Cao, 2015), we suppose that the population of taxpayers can be considered as in-
direct network G = (N,L), where N = {1, . . . , n} is a set of economic agents (tax-
payers), L ⊂ N ×N is an edge set (where each edge is a social connection between
two taxpayer). Previously, a similar approach was applied in (Gubar et al., 2017a;
Gubar et al., 2019; Kumacheva et al., 2019; Kumacheva et al., 2020).
Let the k-th taxpayer has lk connections with other nodes (agents). The interac-
tion of this taxpayer with other agents leads to the information exchange between
them. In the current study the simplest case of interaction, when agents are honest
with each other, is considered. It is possible to investigate an opposite case, when
the degree of information distortion is taken into account, thus, the information con-
dence coecient should be not equal to one. But here we will start from the fact
that the k-th taxpayer receives information from the agents connected with him,
whether they have been audited or not, and she/he believes this information. The
information spreading in the network of agent is supposed to be similar to the algo-
rithm based on the ideas of the natural dissemination of rumors, viruses, ideas and
information (see Nekovee et al., 2007): the information received by the taxpayer is
compared with the total number of the agent's social connections (edges). It means
that the taxpayer k can calculate the portion of her/his audited neighbours and,
thus, estimate the probability P̂k of the future audit and compare it with a known
value P ∗.
In our modelling the social connection of each taxpayer can be represented as
networks of various modications. In the current study we consider random networks
(strongly or weakly connected) and grids. Modeling networks of various modica-
tions, we conduct a scenario analysis both of the interaction of taxpayers, their
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exchange of the information on future tax inspections and posterior assessment of
the possibility of audits, and the process of monitoring and analyzing data on the
taxable population received by the tax authority.
4. Numerical Simulations
The main questions to be answered by the numerical experiment are: do the
dissemination of information among taxpayers and the collecting of information
about taxpayers (their propensity to evade) by the tax authority aect the increase
in tax collection?
To investigate these problems we conduct a numerical simulation, in which we
initiate a network with some initial distribution of evaders and honest taxpayers
and investigate the collecting and dissemination of information over the network
during several iterations.
To illustrate our results we represent examples on the networks with N = n = 49
nodes (the size of total population). We considered various relations of the shares
of evaders and honest taxpayers at initial time moment, therefore, various initial
distributions of risk statuses in the population:
 17% of risk-avoiding, 65% of risk-neutral and 18% of risk-loving (in accordance
with the results presented in psychological study devoted to the risk-propensity
(Niazashvili, 2007));
 25% of risk-avoiding, 65% of risk-neutral and 10% of risk-loving (based on the as-
sumption about Normal distribution of risk statuses (Kendall and Stuart, 1966));
 10% of risk-avoiding, 65% of risk-neutral and 25% of risk-loving (based on the
similar reasoning).
As the simulation parameters in the experiments we use the empirical data
based on the distribution of the income among the population of Russian Federation
in 2019 (The web-site of the Russian Federation State Statistics Service, 2019) (see
Tab. 1).
Table 1. Two modeled groups and average income
group income interval
(rub./month)
average income (rub.) share of population (%)
L less 25000 L = 12500 51
H more 25000 H = 50000 49
Our numerical simulation is conducted for the following values of parameters: tax
rate is θ = 13% and penalty rate is π = 13%, thus, optimal value of the probability
of audit is P ∗ = 0.5 (according to the results of (Bure and Kumacheva, 2010)). At
the same time let's suppose that the actual value of probability of audit is PL = 0.4.
Let's also assume that only risk-averse agents are non-evaders, therefore, the share of
non-evaders in the initial time moment can be νa = 17% (or 25%, or 10%). Unit cost
of auditing is c = 7455 rub. (corresponds to the level of minimum wage in St. Pe-
tersburg (The web-site of the Russian Federation State Statistics Service, 2019)).
In our experiments the process represented on the network should be visualised
using dierent graphical notations:
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 the risk statuses of taxpayers are represented as the various forms of the nodes:
risk-averse agents are represented as triangles, risk-neutral agents are squares
and risk-loving are circles.
 the agents' real income is graded by the size of the nodes: agents with low level
L of income are the small nodes, agents with high level H are large nodes.
In each experiment we obtain four networks which represent dierent views on
the taxable population.
1. Network 1: gives graphic representation of the information about the tax-
payers' declared income (the population prole from the tax authority's stand-
point): in the gures the taxpayers' declared low level L of income are denoted
by red nodes, the taxpayers' declared high level H of income are denoted by
green nodes.
2. Network 2: visualizes the information about compliance of the declared and
true income: if the agent's declared income value corresponds to the real one,
then the color of node is yellow, if the values do not correspond to each other
(the true value is less then the real value) the node is blue.
3. Network 3: shows the result of auditing: if there is no evasion, the agent is
represented by the yellow node, if there is a revealed evasion, she/he is repre-
sented by the blue node, if the taxpayer is not audited the node has no color
(or, grey color).
4. Network 4: represents cumulative result of all previous audits: if the taxpayer
is not audited, she/he is the node which has no color (grey), in the opposite
case, the number of revealed evasions corresponds to the gradient of colors from
red to green.
4.1. Example
To illustrate the proposed approach to the modelling of tax control and visu-
alizing the experimental side of the research, we will study one of the examples
obtained as a result of the conducted simulation in detail. We will discuss the case
of the network with structure of strongly connected network. The initial distribu-
tion considered in the current simulation is 17% of risk-averse, 65% of risk-neutral
and 18% of risk-loving (see the Niazashvili, 2007). The tax authority chooses the
strategy of pressing.
The rst iteration. In the initial moment of time there are two graph represen-
tations of the taxable population: in the gure 4 you can see the network 1 (how
it is seen by the tax authority) and in the gure 5 there is the network 2  the
illustration of the compliance between the declared and true levels of income of the
taxable population.
In the initial moment the total tax revenue can be obtained as the expected value
of the tax authority's income which can be computed according to the equation (1).
For the considered example its value is R = 38836.47 (rub.).
After the rst audit the information about taxpayers' income and their propen-
sities to evasion is received. Thus, we obtain two new networks: the network 3 (the
gure 6), which represents the result of the rst audit, and the network 4 (the gure
7), which is the cumulative result of previous inspections. We can see that, in fact,
the network 3 and the network 4 coincide in this case, because we are taking into
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Fig. 4. Network 1. Initial State of the Pop-
ulation: Declared Income
Fig. 5. Network 2. Initial State of the Pop-
ulation: Compliance of the Declared Income
with Real
Fig. 6. Network 3. The Result of the First
Audit
Fig. 7. Network 4. Cumulative Result of the
Previous Audits
account only one auditing and the information obtained from it only. The net tax
revenue has decreased  after the rst audit its value is R = −4090.0 (rub.). The
inspection is unprotable at the current moment, because in the studied example
the tax authority acts according to the strategy of pressing. It leads to the small
number of the audited evaders and, therefore, small value of collected taxes and
penalties.
The second iteration. At the beginning of the second period, we see a slight
increase in the number of those who declared high income, in other words, those
who interrupt tax evasion. The changes are reected in the network 1 and network
2, represented in the gures 8 and 9.
In accordance with the chosen strategy of pressing, during the second audit the
tax authority tries to audit those who have already evaded rst of all. We obtain the
network 3 (gure 10), corresponding to the results of the audit carried out, and the
network 4 (gure 11), which is a visualization of the information about the taxable
population accumulated over 2 passed inspections.
After the second audit the net tex revenue has increased: R = 81650.00 (rub.). It
has happened due to the fact that the information collected about the population
contributes to a more accurate forecast of tax evasion and, thus, the choice of a
more rational strategy of inspections.
The third iteration. Before the third audit (gures 12 and 13), we can observe
the state of the network, similar to the one that was in the previous period.
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Fig. 8. Network 1. The State of the Popula-
tion after the First Audit: Declared Income
Fig. 9. Network 2. The State of the Popu-
lation after the First Audit: Compliance of
the Declared Income with Real
Fig. 10. Network 3. The Result of the Sec-
ond Audit
Fig. 11. Network 4. Cumulative Result of
the Previous Audits
Fig. 12. Network 1. The State of the Popu-
lation after the Second Audit: Declared In-
come
Fig. 13. Network 2. The State of the Pop-
ulation after the Second Audit: Compliance
of the Declared Income with Real
The results of the third audit are represented as network 3 and network 4 for
the current iteration represented in the gures 14 and 15 correspondingly.
Comparing the results of this inspection with the previous one we can see that
the number of non-evaders does not change, but the tax authority's data on the tax-
able population has changed, which allows to increase the net tax revenue through
taxes and penalties collected from evaders.
The 4-th iteration. Consider the fourth period. The population state after the
third audit is represented in gures 16 and 17. The net tax revenue is R = 125525.0
(rub.).
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Fig. 14. Network 3. The Result of the Third
Audit
Fig. 15. Network 4. Cumulative Result of
the Previous Audits
Fig. 16. Network 1. The State of the Pop-
ulation after the Third Audit: Declared In-
come
Fig. 17. Network 2. The State of the Popu-
lation after the Third Audit: Compliance of
the Declared Income with Real
The results of the fourth inspection are represented in the gures 18 and 19.
The trend revealed after the previous inspection remains constant. The number of
honest taxpayers is not increasing, but the tax authority's income is still growing.
Fig. 18. Network 3. The Result of the
Fourth Audit
Fig. 19. Example 4. Cumulative Result of
Previous Audits
4.2. Examples of Comparative Analysis
The analysis similar to that presented in the considered example was carried out
for other modications of the network and other initial distributions of risk statuses
of agents in the population. Further several results of the conducted analysis are
demonstrated.
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Comparison of two strategies. Let's compare the protability of the strategies of
pressing and information collecting. For this purpose we consider the network of the
same conguration and with the same initial distribution of risk statuses on it. We
will study strongly connected network and following initial state of the population:
17% of risk-avoiding, 65% of risk-neutral and 18% of risk-loving agents. For the given
initial conditions the strategy of pressing was studied in the previous example. For
the strategy of information collecting the following results were obtained:
 Initial state: R = 38836.47 (rub.)
 After the rst audit: R = 34910.0 (rub.)
 After the second audit: R = 59855.0 (rub.)
 After the third audit: R = 116060.0 (rub.)
The dynamic of the net tax revenue (1) for both types of the strategies is represented
in the gure 20. In the diagram the blue bars represent the tax authority's revenue
after the respective inspections using the strategy of pressing, the red ones refer
to the strategy of information collecting. Obviously, after a sharp drop in its value
Fig. 20. The Revenue Dynamics for Dierent Strategies of Auditing
after the rst audit, net tax revenue has a steady upward trend, more evident for
the strategy of pressing, than for the strategy of information collecting.
When studying the dynamics over a long-term period (gure 21), for example, 10
inspections, which is equal to 10 years, it is easy to see that net tax revenue stabilizes
at approximately the same values, regardless of the chosen strategy. However, in the
short term (less than 5 years), the strategy of pressing is obviously more protable.
The similar results were obtained for other network congurations (grid and weakly
connected network) used for performed simulations.
Comparison of the network congurations. Next, let's investigate the eect
of the type of the considered network on the tax collection. As one can see from
the previous example, a large number of inspections smooths out the dierences
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Fig. 21. The 10-years Revenue Dynamics
between strategies, therefore, we focus on the rst iterations of the method under
consideration. Let's estimate the cumulative system revenue for the rst three checks
for the same initial distribution of risk statuses (17% of risk-avoiding, 65% of risk-
neutral and 18% of risk-loving) and dierent network congurations (strongly and
weakly connected random graphs and grid).
First, let's consider the results of simulations obtained for the strategy of press-
ing. Comparison of all three network congurations by their protability is illus-
trated in the gure 22: the green polyline demonstrates the revenue dynamic mod-
eled on the weakly connected graph, yellow polyline shows dynamic for the strongly
connected network, and red color corresponds to grid.
It can be seen from the graphs that in the long term period, the largest model
revenue is possible on a strongly connected network, while in the short term, the
simulation gives the most eective results for a weakly connected network. The grid
is proving to be the most tax-ineective model.
The dierences in the dynamics of net tax revenue obtained on the networks of
all three congurations for the information collecting strategy are less obvious (see
gure 23).
But still, as earlier, the most ecient in terms of collecting taxes is the strongly
connected network (yellow polyline), the most ineective is the grid (red polyline).
Comparison of the Initial Distributions of Risk Statuses. For a change, let's
consider the results of simulating a strategy of information collecting for a network
type grid and obtain the revenue dynamics for dierent initial distribution of risk
statuses among the taxable population.
Figures 24  29 show the initial states of the network, represented as a grid, for
the corresponding initial distributions of the risk propensity among the agents of
the population.
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Fig. 22. The Revenue Dynamics for Dierent Network Congurations: the Strategy of
Pressing
Fig. 23. The Revenue Dynamics for Dierent Network Congurations: the Strategy of
Information Collecting
Figure 24 illustrates network of type 1 and gure 25 illustrates network of type 2
for the case when the portions at the initial time moment are following: 25% of risk-
avoiding, 65% of risk-neutral and 10% of risk-loving (according to the assumption
Information Collecting and Dissemination in the Network of Taxpayers 251
that the portion of risk-averse can be represented as a quantile of the given distri-
bution).
Fig. 24. Network 1. Initial State of the Pop-
ulation: Declared Income
Fig. 25. Network 2. Initial State of the Pop-
ulation: Compliance of the Declared Income
with Real
Another initial distribution  17% of risk-avoiding, 65% of risk-neutral and 18%
of risk-loving  corresponds to the case of simulation related to the psychological
study mentioned before (Niazashvili, 2007). This case of modelling is illustrated in
the gures 26 and 27.
Fig. 26. Network 1. Initial State of the Pop-
ulation: Declared Income
Fig. 27. Network 2. Initial State of the Pop-
ulation: Compliance of the Declared Income
with Real
The third case of initial distribution is an opposite to the rst one: 10% of risk-
avoiding, 65% of risk-neutral and 25% of risk-loving. It is represented in the gures
28 and 29.
Since in the previous examples we saw that the most signicant leaps in revenue
dynamics occur during the rst inspections, we will restrict our consideration by the
results of simulations of rst ve inspections. The gure 30 illustrates comparison of
the results obtained on the grid for dierent initial distributions of risk propensity. In
the diagram the green bars represent the tax authority's income after the respective
inspections for the case of 10% of risk-avoiding, 65% of risk-neutral and 25% of
risk-loving, the blue bars  17% of risk-avoiding, 65% of risk-neutral and 18% of
risk-loving, and the yellow bars  25% of risk-avoiding, 65% of risk-neutral and 10%
of risk-loving.
It can be seen from the diagram 30 that, starting from the third audit, for all
subsequent inspections it is not signicant which initial distribution of risk statuses
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Fig. 28. Network 1. Initial State of the Pop-
ulation: Declared Income
Fig. 29. Network 2. Initial State of the Pop-
ulation: Compliance of the Declared Income
with Real
Fig. 30. The Revenue Dynamics for Dierent Initial Distributions on the Grid and Strat-
egy of Information Collecting
was assumed in the simulation. The impact of dierent shares of risk averse on the
revenue of tax authority is smoothed out. Considering the rst iterations, it is worth
noting that the higher the proportion of risk averse, the greater the drop in the net
tax revenue after the rst audit and the higher the jump after the second. After the
second inspection, the largest share of risk averse agents (25%) brings the maximum
revenue, the same result is obtained after the third one, but there is no longer a
direct relationship here. The smallest proportion of risk-averse in the population
(10%) leads to a slower but more stable growth in tax revenue.
Simulations carried out for networks of other congurations and using the strat-
egy of pressing give the similar conclusions.
4.3. Numerical Simulation: Results
A series of the experiments carried out before gives the following conclusions.
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First, it was found that the looping process occurs early enough  no later than
the in the fth iteration, each of which corresponds to a simulation of a new tax
audit. From the standpoint of assessing the revenue of the tax authorities, it means
that its values will not change signicantly during subsequent inspections, only
uctuating around the values reached in the rst iterations. Obviously, the number
of evaders in the network will also not change signicantly, although actual evasions
can be redistributed among agents.
Second, the results of experiment show that the strategy of pressing is more
eective (in terms of increasing net tax revenue) than information collecting strat-
egy. The chosen auditing strategy and network conguration also aect the rate
of change in the population structure (system stabilization). Moreover, the type of
network that best simulates the social connections of the studied population also
has a signicant impact on the eciency of the process in terms of tax collection.
The current work considered simulations on three types of networks. If they are
arranged in descending order of eciency, the following sequence will be obtained:
strongly connected network, weakly connected network, grid.
Third, it was found that an increase in the initial share of risk averse has no
stable inuence on the dynamics of the tax authority's revenue in long-term period
(for a big number of iterations) and gives big jumps in short-term period (during
rst several iterations).
5. Conclusions and Prospects
Such important problem as the tax evasions was studied in the framework of
game-theoretical modelling based on the idea of Bayesian updating. The tax au-
diting is considered not only as the tool to collect taxes, but also as the process
of monitoring of population and gathering information about taxpayers. According
to our assumption, another task the tax control is designed for is the dissemina-
tion of information about future inspections in order to stimulate taxpayers to pay
taxes honestly. This multipurpose process is modeled as a repeated game which
is based on a static model of interaction between the tax authority and taxpayers
according to the principal-agent hierarchical scheme and the Bayesian procedure
for re-evaluating the probabilities of tax evasion by the principal, on the one hand,
and the probabilities of tax audits by agents, on the other hand.
To investigate the proposed approach, a series of simulations were run. The
simulation results allow to study the impact of various parameters of the audit
conducted on the net tax revenue.
We can generalize the results of our study, focusing on the following key mo-
ments.
First, the current research shows that the collecting of information about the
structure of the population brings a positive eect for the revenue of scal system
and increases the total number of honest taxpayers.
Second, the performed simulation shows that the natural way of the informa-
tion dissemination is not so eective as it was expected: it provides a very slow
spreading of information among taxpayers. In addition, the circulating of informa-
tion only among the nearest neighbors leads to a fairly fast looping of the process.
In order to bring the simulation results closer to real processes, in the future it is
planned to replace this method of information dissemination by a Markov random
process in the network. Moreover, to make the studied model closer to real life, we
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should take into account the information condence coecient, which is not equal
to one.
Third, the dependence between the net tax revenue and the initial distribution
of risk statuses is not stable for both types of the strategies of tax auditing. On
the other hand, we obtained that the dependence between the nal distribution of
the evasions and the network conguration is very high. Moreover, dierent types
of networks aect the revenue of the tax authority in dierent ways. From this
fact another prospect for future research follows: to obtain a statistical distribution
of nal states of the network running the simulation for more number of times.
Moreover, the idea to run a series of simulations for the network which contains a
large number of nodes, seems to be a very attractive. We assume that it will help




Let's formulate the theorem about conjugate distribution families (see De Groot,
1974).
Theorem 1. Let X1, X2, . . . , Xn be a sample from the Bernoulli distribution with
unknown value of parameter W . Suppose, that prior distribution of W is the beta
distribution with parameters α and β (α > 0, β > 0). Then the posterior distribution
W when Xj = xj (j = 1, n) is the beta distribution with parameters α + y and





Let's dene Beta distribution (see Kendall and Stuart, 1966):
Denition 1. The random quantity X is beta distributed with parameters α




B(α,β) ,when 0 < x < 1,
0, in other cases,
where B(α, β) =
1∫
0
xα−1(1− x)β−1dx is the beta-function.
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